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Discretionary judicial decision making is an undecided transexual, for it has been claimed to be the very catalyst transforming
injustice into justice. Yet, this same discretionary decision making
has been damned as the very cause of injustice; therein lies the
deep-rooted problem. This very ambivalence is inherent in the nature of discretion.
This article is concerned with constraining and structuring discretion rather than eliminating it. Although discretionary power
can be "dangerous and harmful,"' it is a necessary governmental
tool. "What is obviously needed is balance-discretionary power
which is neither excessive nor inadequate." 2 This article's specific
concern is with the discretionary judicial process rather than the
end result of a given situation. Discretion is analogous to a judicial
"black box" 3 where factual situations are inserted into the box and
decisions are taken out. Yet, this process does not explain the conversion of facts into decisions. While discretion opts for vagueness,
arbitrariness and generalization, rules and guidelines opt for clarity, certitude, and specificity. Discretion is not inherently malignant
and as an alternative to its elimination Davis has suggested that
*
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I. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27 (1971).
2. Id.
3. The "black box" is a basic concept of motivational behavior whereby input, or
stimuli, and output, or results, are totally visible. Yet, the individual's mental processes occuring "between inputs and outputs are forever hidden from view." J. ENGLE, D. KOLLAT &
R. BLACKWELL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 22 (1973). Any explanation of what intervened between the input and output can be only inferential.
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discretion be confined, checked, and structured.4 This article's focus
is directed at the structuring of discretion rather than at its elimination.
At first glance the structuring of judicial discretion appears to
be an attempt to harnass the unharnassable or to control the uncontrollable. Despite this obvious conceptual chasm, Davis declares
that structuring discretion "means regularizing it, organizing it, and
producing order in it, so that decisions will achieve a higher quality
of justice."5 Structuring is "controlling the manner of the exercise
of discretionary power within designated parameters."6 Further
perceptive observation indicates that the key weapon to curb the
unbridled exercise of discretion is "openness." This is so because
openness "is the natural enemy of arbitrariness (excessive or uncontrolled discretion), and a natural ally in the fight against injustice." 7 According to Davis, "openness" includes an arsenal of plans,
policy statements, rules, findings, and precedents. 8 Davis' system of
"openness," however, de-energizes because he fails to truly operationalize either his concept or his arsenal of "openness."
This article advocates the structuring of discretion "so that judicial decisions will achieve a high quality of justice." 9 Achieving
this high standard of justice requires an operational pursuit within
a specific forum. Thus, this article will pursue the regularization
and organization of judicial decisions within the explicit forum of
salvage award determinations. The method chosen to regularize
and organize judicial decisions in salvage award cases is modern
behavioral science decision theory. This theory applies the scientific
method by utilizing the decision technique of statistics or
probability theory. The selection of this method is primarily based
upon: 1) the fact that law in general, and judicial decision making
specifically, forms one of the behavioral decision sciences and
therefore must be recognized, accepted, and analyzed as such; 2)
the fact that case law demands the conceptualization of behavioral
science decision analysis, probability theory, and the strict application of the same;1° and 3) the fact that there is a burgeoning need
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 27.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 94.
See notes 40 and 42 infra, and accompanying text.
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for the actual usage of quantitative analysis in the law." Before
applying this type of analysis, the recent history of quantitative
methodology in the law must be discussed.
I.

MODERN DECISION THEORY AND THE LAW

Louis Brandeis was one of the earliest proponents of empiricism in the law. His Muller v. Oregon'2 brief relied more on economic, social, and medical data than legal argument to
demonstrate the harmful effects of long working hours on women.
Felix Frankfurter later noted the Brandeis brief as "epoch-making," 3 and stated:
There should be much flexibility as to method .... Freely we
must utilize all the allies there are-statistics, history, anthropology, psychology. But let us beware of their limitations
and partially your own.14
Brandeis 5 and Frankfurter have not been alone in their appeals for
and prediction of empiricism and the law. Such renowned legal jurists as Cardozo,16 Hand, ' 7 Holmes,'" and Pound 9 have recognized
the need for the usage of empiricism or the scientific method in the
law.
With the perceived need, demand, and predicted usage of empiricism in the law firmly rooted, the issue becomes whether this
need, demand, and prediction have been fulfilled. A meaningful
response requires that one view the record of empiricism and the
law. An overview of this record has discovered that:
1) the need for efficient and effective judicial administration
has led to a growing number of studies and data collection
procedures; 20
11. See notes 106 and 42 infra, and accompanying text.
12. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
13. Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in ConstitutionalLaw, 29 HARV. L. REV.
353, 365 (1916).
14. Frankfurter, The Conditionsfor, and the Aims and Methods of Legal Research, 15
IOWA L. REV. 129, 139-40 (1930).
15.

A. MASON, BRANDEIS: LAWYER AND JUDGE IN THE MODERN STATE 102, 107

(1933).

16. B. CARDOZO,

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

66-97 (1921).

17. United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
19. R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959).
20. H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & H. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); M.
ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964); and A.
VANDERBILT, THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1978

3

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 [1978], Art. 9
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 8

2)

in the 1930's, criminologists began to employ quantitative
positive and normative models of
methods for comparing
21
criminal behavior;

3)

after World War II, sociologists began to apply empirical
on the peodevices to the analysis of law formation impact
22
ple and the law profession's composition;

4)

in the late 1950's, judicial behaviorists started to apply quantitative techniques when exploring the various factors affectjudicial behavior is an
ing judicial decisions. Predicting
23
inherent part of this analysis;

5)

empirical studies pertaining to various segments of the
United States legal system were pursued. Kalven and
Zeisel's study of The American Jury24 and the American Bar
Foundation study of The Legal Needs of the Public2 5are examples of such empirical studies;
statistics have been used extensively in civil rights litigation,
in the area of voting rights and employment disparticularly 26
crimination;

6)

7) statistics have been utilized in antitrust cases when establishing relevant market data and defendants share 27thereof,
market surveys in deceptive advertising,2 8 and trademark in30 been used in personal
also have
fringement
cases. 29 Statistics
death actions.
and wrongful
injury
Despite the aforementioned usage of empiricism in the law, in
1963, Nagel3 recognized the embryonic stage of empiricism in the
law when he predicted that twentieth century scientific methodology, which had engulfed and rejuvenated the social sciences, soon
would do the same for the law. Nagel said that
21.

Burrow, Crime and Social Reaction of Right and Wrong- A Study in Clinical

Sociology, 24 J. AM. INST. CIUM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685 (1934).
22. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN viii-ix, 212-23 (1962).

23. Lovevinger, Jurimetrics." The Methodology o/Legal Inquiry, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 5 (1963).
24.

H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).

25. B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1974).
26. Dawson, Probabilities and Prejudice in Establishing Statistical Inferences, 13
JURIMETRICS 191, 196-99 (1973).
27. Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
28. Bernacchi, Advertising andIts Discretionary Control by the FTC. A Need/or Empirically Based Criteria, 52 J. URB. L. 223, 248-99 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F.2d 88 (6th Cir.
1959); Aloc Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1970).

30. O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959).
31. Nagel, Testing Empirical Generalizations in LegalResearch, 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365
(1963).
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[tihe twentieth century has been witnessing a methodological
revolution in the social sciences. Psychology, which is partly a
biological science, was the first social science affected, then sociology succumbed. Then, economics. Since the end of World War
II, political science has been undergoing a methodological rejuvenation. Its close neighbor, the field of law, seems next in line.32
In the same vein, Rosenberg, in 1968, expressed further optimism
about the likelihood of using scientific research in the law when he
said that legal research "will ground its findings in data and will
• . . also go outside the library to the field. It will insist that hunch
and speculation be complemented as much as practicable by care33
fully gathered data."
The point is that, while definite progress has been made toward the interaction of law and empiricism, the field of law has
been slower in adopting empiricism than any of the other social
sciences. The problem is inherent in traditional legal analysis because lawyers insist upon relying on individual cases and precedents for rules of law to determine court decision patterns.
Unquestionably, "[t]he [r]evolution [has been] [d]eferred" 3 4 because most lawyers are neither schooled in the rigorous scientific
method discipline, nor do they totally accept the legality and ethics
associated with the discipline. Nagel has pointed succinctly to the
problem by stating:
Legal scholars have long been concerned almost exclusively
with individual cases, chronologies of precedent development,
armchair speculation . . . and especially descriptions
of the
35

holdings in sets of [individualized] judicial opinions.

In essence, the individualized case method which emphasizes dissimilarity rather than similarity is the antithesis of the scientific
method. The case method stresses disaggregation which seriously
impedes any meaningful aggregation into theory. On the other
hand, the scientific method is grounded in the proposition that the
"basic aim of science is theory, ' 36 which stresses "explanation, understanding, prediction and control," 37 rather than rational devel32.

Id. at 381.

33.

W. MEYER, DOLLARS, DELAY AND THE AUTOMOBILE VICTIM (1968) (see forward

by M. Rosenberg at iv) (emphasis added).
34. Gazell, The Revolution Deferred Researching the Law, 22 UTAH L. REV. 23 (1972).
35. Nagel, supra note 31, at 381.
36. F. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH: EDUCATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 8 (2d ed. 1973) (emphasis added).

37. Id. at 9.
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opment with its high level of risk and uncertainty.
It should be noted that the scientific method receives its vitality
from information. Techniques for discovering, gathering, and analyzing information are the very essence of the scientific method and
the increased quantity and quality of information3" generates
Davis' desired state of "openness."3 9 Thus, a greater amount of correct information creates a greater openness which is needed for the
structuring of discretion. Correspondingly, limited information results in less openness and less structuring of discretion.
II.

HAND'S CALCULUS HERITAGE:

A DEMAND

FOR THE STANDARD OF PROBABILITY

Perhaps the most renowned and perceptive demand for
probability theory analysis was presented by Judge Learned Hand
in his classic United States v. CarrolTowing Co.4" opinion. In an
attempt to determine the liability of a vessel that had injured another vessel, Hand said:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her
moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those
about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1)
The probability that she will break away; (2) [T]he gravity of the
resulting injury, if she does; (3) The burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring the notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L; and
the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL. Applied to the
situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break from her
fasts and the damage she will do, vary with the place and time
.41

In essence, Hand stated that the determination of the injuring vessel's duty to provide against resulting injuries is dependent upon
three major independent variables. The relationship can be listed
symbolically as:
D f(P, L, and B)
Dependent Variable:
D = Duty to provide against resulting injury
Independent Variables:
38.
39.
40.
41.

See note 105 infra.
See notes 7 and 8 supra.
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
Id. at 173.
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1) P
2) L
away;
3) B

= Probability that the injuring vessel will break away;
= The gravity of resulting injury if the vessel does break
and
= The burden of adequate precautions by the injuring
vessel's owner.

Hand asserts that the three independent variables have a precise
relationship that determines the existence of the duty and the ensuing liability. That is, the equilibrium point of duty and liability determination is when B = P x L. Therefore, liability exists when B is
less than P X L and no liability exists when B is greater than P x L.
Judge Hand modestly prefaced his algebraic expression in
Carroll by stating that "possibly it serves to bring this notion [liability determination] into relief to state it in algebraic terms."" 2 His
42. Id. This statement must be viewed as the operationalization of Hand's "calculus."
Simply stated, Hand's "calculus" demands specific implementation. Hand's suggestion to
implement probability theory was a call for subjective probability. Probability theory may be
viewed as comprised of two major classification schemes-objective and subjective theory.
Objective probability theory is based on objective sample data, while subjective probability
theory is based on subjective evaluations.
Without being encumbered by the strict operational mechanics of these two major
branches of statistical decision theory, suffice it to say that, analytically, they are distinguishable because of their different sources of information. Classical decision theory is predicated
upon sampling theory or sample evidence. Data, therefore, is gathered from a sample that is
deemed representative of the larger unit from which that sample was chosen. All estimates
and predictions, therefore, are based on information gathered about the sample and then
imputed to the universe. On the other hand, subjective decision theory is predicated on nonsample evidence or information. Subjective statistics recognize the need for and value of
non-sample information in decision making where no sample data are available. Essentially,
subjective probability places a high value on the mere existence of information to be put into
the weighing of alternatives by the decision maker. Subjective statistics enable the decision
maker, who does not have objectively precise sample data available to him, to lessen his
decision uncertainty. This is accomplished by permitting him to weigh, evaluate, and utilize
whatever information and experience he has available to him.
While the success of this approach rests upon the decision maker's perspicacity and
insight when evaluating and using his other information and experience, nevertheless, it enables him to reduce the risk of uncertainty when alternative decisions are available.
One other valuable feature of subjective probability is its adaptability. As objective sample data are collected and made available, subjective decision theory enables the revision of
the decision maker's estimates to reflect the objective sample data.
In the face of an uncertain decision and no objective sample data, Learned Hand obviously has demanded that subjective evaluations be attached to his independent variables
with the decision of liability based on the equilibrium point of his independent variables (B
- P x L). Hand's "calculus" demands that those who determine the vessel's liability bring
their best judgment to bear, using both their common sense and experience, to determine in a
quantitative manner the weight to be given each independent variable. In this manner it can
be determined whether the injuring vessel has any liability.
It also should be recognized that the degree of liability, based on the degree of duty, is
ascertainable given the necessity or desire of determining the degree of disequilibrium when
B # PL.
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conceptual framework requires that the independent variables be
assigned quantum meaning through the use of mathematical
probability theory. The denial of Hand's "calculus" as being anything but a probabilistic standard is an absurdity that is consistent
with the legal system's tardiness in fully accepting the scientific
method with its attendant empirical techniques. While Hand's formularization has been accepted as a very perceptive conceptual
shorthand for determining legal liability, it has been totally ignored
by legal analysts as a formula for yielding specific and predictable
outcomes. This observation becomes even more curious when one
realizes that it is precisely this type of analysis that would encourage the law to consistently produce a high level of open and
well-reasoned determinations.
The best stage for applying statistics and probability theory to
the law is in the area of salvage award determinations. On the one
hand, salvage award determinations are generally smitten with the
use of excessive judicial discretion, while on the other hand, such
determinations have specific, generally accepted, and well-defined
criteria for rendering a scientific determination.

Once Hand's forceful demand for probability theory is firmly established, and the nature of the probability theory to be used is well understood, all that remains is the development of measurements for the purpose of implementing the scheme for decision analysis
offered herein. Initially, it should be recognized that two separate and distinct scales should
be developed to fully and meaningfully encompass the variety of loss possibilities that could
be included within Hand's "calculus." A loss continuum, or scale, must be developed for
both the property and human loss. While both types of loss ultimately would share in the
recovery, no attempt should be made to equate the two scales because they are mutually
exclusive.
Given the acknowledged equilibrium point of B = P < L, the decision maker, be he
judge or jury, would determine the weight to be assigned to each variable. That is, independent values must be given to the burden of taking adequate precautions to prevent the given
injury (B), the probability that the injury will occur (P), and the gravity of the resulting
injury (L) if it does occur. Of course the time, place, and general nature of the circumstances
must be considered. For example, let us assume that the decision makers collective and subjectively scaled value for determining the strength of the burden of taking adequate precautions in a given situation was .75 on a property loss continuum where 0.00 was absolutely no
burden and 1.00 was the maximum burden. The decision makers collectively deemed that
the probability of the injury was .80, where 0.00 is certain non-occurrence and 1.00 is certain
occurrence. The decision makers collectively deemed that the gravity of the property loss was
subjectively valued as being a .40 on a property loss continuum where 0.00 is designated as a
totally slight injury and 1.00 is designated as the most grave injury. Based on these subjective
assessments, and because B > P x L (.75 > .8 x .4), a duty existed to take the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury from occurring and was not overcome by the interactive
effect of P x L. Hence, the duty was breached and liability attaches.
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III.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND SALVAGE
AWARD DETERMINATIONS

Perhaps nowhere in the law is the use and abuse of discretion
more obvious than in the determination of a salvage award made
by an admiralty court. It is admitted and even sanctioned in courts
and legal treatises that salvage awards are controlled by judicial
discretion.4" The limits of this discretion appeared to be so boundless that, in 1882, Judge Hughes found it necessary to state that
while the amount of the salvage award rested squarely within the
discretion of the judge, he must not capriciously nor arbitrarily arrive at a decision. Indeed, he must fully recognize the law of salvage.44
A variety of courts have attempted to lessen the almost inherent arbitrary and capricious nature of determining the amount of a
salvage award by listing a number of factors, elements, or ingredients upon which the salvage award depends. For example, in The
Sandringham,the court defined salvage as
[a] reward or bounty exceeding the actual value of their services,
given to those by means of whose labor, intrepidity, and perseverance a ship or her goods have been saved from shipwreck or
other dangers of the sea. .

.

. It may be laid down as a cardinal

part of salvage that the right of compensation to be allowed in
any case must not only compensate the labor and exertion and
danger attending the particular enterprise, but must be so liberal,
if the condition of the fund at disposal permit, as to attract public
attention .... 45
Other examples where the courts have listed or acknowledged
the independent variables to be considered when determining the
amount of salvage awards exist, 46 but the most classic and quoted
43. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 559-62 (1975); The
Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930). Further, in Waterman SS. Corp. v. Dean, 171 F.2d
408, 411 (4th Cir. 1948), the Court acknowledged that "It]he trial court is given wide discretion in fixing the amount of a salvage award, and appeals questioning only the amount
awarded are not encouraged." See also Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. Indian Towing
Co., 232 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1956) and Pannier v. Barge BT 1793, 395 F. Supp. 1019, 1037
(E.D. Va. 1974), in which the court candidly admitted that "whatever is salvaged is still the
property of the owner, but he owes whatever salvage award the court thinks is proper."
44. The Sandringham, 10 F. 556 (E.D. Va. 1882).
45. Id. at 572.
46. See, e.g., The Robert S. Besnard, 144 F. 992, 1002 (D.S.C. 1906) where the court
stated:
Salvage is in the nature of a bounty for extraordinary exertions, as distinguished
from payment for ordinary exertions, being the outgrowth of public policy, and
designedto encourage persons who are under no legal obligations to do so to go to
the rescue of vessels exposed to perils beyond their own ability to subdue, by giving
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list of factors that an admiralty court uses when determining the
size of salvage awards was given by Justice Clifford in The
Blackwall,47 where he said:
Courts of admiralty usually consider the following circumstances
as the main ingredients in determining the amount of the reward
to be decreed for a salvage service:
(1) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage
service.
(2) The promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering
the service and saving the property.
(3) The value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to which such property was
exposed.
(4) The risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property
from the impending peril.
(5) The value of the property saved.
(6) The degree of danger from which the property was rescued.4 8
a reward in addition to compensation for the work done. The amount of such
bounty or reward depends upon the success achieved, the value of the property
saved, and the degree of danger from which it was rescued, and it is enhanced or
diminished according to the skill or courage displayed, the time and labor bestowed, and the risk to persons or property encountered by the salvors. While there
are many ingredients, the one essential element is that the property shall be saved
from danger, either actually impending or reasonably to be apprehended. In the
absence of such peril, it is not 'salvage,' however beneficial and meritorious the
service may be.
See also The Thomas Morgan, 123 F. 781, 785 (D.S.C. 1903), in which the court stated:
Salvage is personal in its primary character, and the ingredients of salvage service,
as generally stated, are: First, enterprise in the salvors in going out in tempestuous
weather to assist a ship in distress, risking their lives to save life and property;
secondly, the degree of danger and distress from which the property is rescued;
thirdly, the degree of labor and skill undergone and displayed by the salvors;
fourthly, the time occupied; fifthly, the respective values of the property salved and
risked. When all these concur, a large award will be given. When none, or scarcely
any, the compensation can hardly be termed a salvage compensation; but it is little
more than remuneration p~ro opere et labore. Hence, a mortgagee of a tug that had
been sunk, who allowed lighters to the owner under hire expressly stipulated, is not
a salvor." This is because another raised vessel and the lighterman performed no
service, except as watchman. Moreover, the hire of the lighter did not rank as a
salvage claim.
For an appropriate discussion of these independent variables and the usage of these variables
by the various courts, see G. ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES

739-52 (1939).

47. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
48. Id. While Justice Clifford's list is generally accepted as "the list," see Lancaster v.
Smith, 330 F. Supp. 65, 67 (S.D. Ala. 1971), a variety of cases acknowledge the existence of
other possible independent variables. See, e.g., The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524, 528 (E.D.S.C.
1930) and The Sandringham, 10 F. 556, 573 n.38 (E.D. Va. 1882). For the most part, the
different lists do not vary extensively. Clifford's list captures the substance of all but a few of
the lists. See also Barge 592 v. Delroy, 1938 Am. Mar. Cases 57 (E.D. Pa.), which extensively
cites the Blackwall decision stating that the amount of salvage award is a matter to be determined by sound judicial discretion.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss3/9

10

Bernacchi: Structuring Discretionary Judicial Decision Making: A Probabilist
DETERMINATION

OF SALVAGE AWARDS

While Justice Clifford's list of "main ingredients" (independent
variables)4 9 is an attempt at precise acknowledgement and subsequent measurement of each "ingredient," the "law of salvage" has
contorted the list as a justification for avoiding such precision.
Gilmore and Black state that the list demonstrates that
[tihe variables are so many and so incapable of exact measurement that it will probably be fruitless for either party to take
an appeal merely on the ground that the award was incorrectly
computed. 50
The authors further bolster their position by suggesting that such
imponderables as "skill," "energy," "risk," and "danger" are, of
course, immeasureable. 5 '
Granted that no two cases are alike and that one must view all
of the attendant circumstances of each case before any amount can
be determined,5 2 nevertheless, Gilmore and Black's total avoidance
position, as well as the position of admiralty law, is hardly acceptable when appropriate measurement techniques are available. It has
become obvious that while the Court in The Blackwall called for
measurement standards, this was followed by a rationale for nonmeasurement and a failure to undertake any serious steps toward
that end. Unfortunately, this demonstrates a form of intellectual
myopia that encumbers the law in this area. An infinitely more
desireable alternative to this myopia would be to attempt to bring
precise independent variable recognition and measurement to the
"main ingredients" that determine the amount of a salvage award.
The law's hesitation to even attempt to measure the input becomes
even more puzzling when one realizes that an admiralty court's determination of a salvage award must be couched in monetary
terms. The present determinative formula appears to be no more
than the consideration of a few main ingredients in conjunction
with an acknowledgement of the "surrounding circumstances" resulting in a salvage award of a given amount.
This article is concerned with: 1) the acknowledgement of
Clifford's "main ingredients," or independent variables, by case law
and, 2) the development of a decision model based on the usage of
subjective probabilities to reflect measured relationships among the
49. The most extensive list is presented by M. NORRIs, THE LAW OF SALVAGE 385-422
(1958). Between the main categories and subcategories of independent variables, the author
lists and discusses an incredible 35 categories.
50. G. GILMORE, supra note 43, at 559.
51. Id.
52. The Wahkeena, 56 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1932).
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various independent variables. The single goal of this model is to
structure the discretion of judicial decisions for salvage awards by
rendering such decisions more orderly, justifiable, informative, and
predictable. Therefore, the focus will be on the unquantified and
verbally positive model of present admiralty market place law regarding salvage awards, followed by a presentation of the author's
quantified normative model for the purpose of creating a better
functioning marketplace."
IV.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Most salvage award judgments, either implicitly or explicitly,
consider Clifford's list of main ingredients5 4 when determining the
size of the award. Consequently, admiralty judicial discretion is
framed around the recognition of Clifford's list. Indeed, this list has
been referred to "as a category of reasons for giving much or little."' 55 Unfortunately, this statement defies a consistent interpretation. The mere listing of the ingredients assumes that each
ingredient is measurable and, thus, considered in the salvage award
decision. In reality, only the most perceptive could expect such a
specific input-output relationship.
The immediate task, therefore, is to discuss each of Clifford's
ingredients and to establish a measurement scheme for each one.
This will be followed by a determination of the relationships
among the various ingredients. The format for this section will be
first to fully develop each of Clifford's ingredients by case law. This
will enable the reader to appreciate the state of the law for each of
these variables and to determine the need for a meaningful measurement scheme. The second objective of this section is the development of a formula that will accurately describe the relationship
among Clifford's various ingredients.
Based on these objectives, the order of Clifford's main ingredients to be discussed is based upon the measurement or evaluation
technique to be used for the specific ingredient, which, in turn, is
deduced from the case law surrounding each ingredient. This order
53. It may be helpful for the reader to consider the further development of this article
in light of the well worn general formula for dependency. That formula is Y f (XI, X2 ....
X ) where Y equals the dependent variable or the amount of the salvage award to be determined and X I through X6 are the various independent variables, or Clifford's "main ingredients" upon which Y depends for its value.
54. 7he Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
55. Canadian Gov't Merchant Marine, Ltd. v. United States, 7 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir.
1925).
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reflects whether the measurement scheme selected is on the usual
monetary basis, or whether the scheme chosen is a probabilistic
one. The first three ingredients to be discussed are the value of the
property saved, the value of the salving property, and the labor and
time spent by salvors rendering salvage. These ingredients are immediately convertible based on conventional property evaluation
techniques. This is not true, however, for such intangibles as the
danger from which the salved property was rescued, the salvor's
risk in saving the property, and the promptitude, skill, and energy
of the salvage operation. These last ingredients all share the characteristic of not being amenable to direct monetary measurement.
This measurability distinction has not been recognized by case law.
While case law has increased or decreased salvage awards based on
danger, risk, and skill, it has never seen fit to specifically and consistently measure that danger, risk, or skill. Case law has been a
series of unstructured discretions in determining danger, risk, and
skill. This is because the law has failed to measure and justify the
danger, risk, or skill relative to the awarded value of the property
salved and the labor and time spent by salvors. Courts must formularize the importance and value of the degree of danger to the
salved; the risk taken by the salvor; and the promptitude, skill, and
energy used in salving. This should be done in each salvage award
determination case by using scientific or empirical methodology.
While this method would not eliminate discretion completely, it
would certainly constrain and structure that discretion. The final
result would be a better informed and predictable marketplace of
salvage award determinations. In essence, the quality of justice
would be improved.
The following analysis is not meant to be inflexible. Rather, it
is meant to be an evolving-working analysis for the purpose of
moving the determination of salvage awards from the arena of unstructured discretion to the arena of structured discretion, yielding
well justified and predictable decisions.
A.

The Salved Property's Value

The value of the property salved has always been an ingredient
"of the greatest importance in deciding on the award to be made." 6
Judge Cochran, in The Shreveport,5 7 wrote that the great contest
had been over the sound value of the salved ship and the necessary
56. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 43, at 560.
57. 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930).
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repairs. 8 Relying on Judge Cochran's statement, Gilmore and
Black claim that while "[v]aluation of the salved property is only
one of the items . . it is unquestionably the most important one
.
. "I' While this statement may overstate the relative importance of the value of the salved property, nonetheless, it adds validity to its acceptance as a main ingredient or independent variable.
The determination of this ingredient is guided by the following
considerations: 1) the actual value of the salved property, 60 be it
ship, freight, or cargo, is the upper theoretical limit of the salvage
award. This is so because one element of a salvage claim is the
successful saving of the property for the owner's benefit;6 1 2) the
courts generally have determined that the amount of the salvage
award is based on the value of the property in her damaged state at
the time of the salvage and not the value that existed prior to the
time of peril or distress. 6 2 For example, the value of The Captain
Tom and The Tom R. Jr.,63 designated at the time of their stranding, was $16,000 and $7,000, respectively. The value was not based
on their worth before salvage which was $18,500-$21,500 and
$13,000, respectively;' 3) it has been determined that the burden of
proving the value of the salved property rests upon those claiming
the salvage award;65 and, 4) as nearly as can be determined, conventional property law is used to determine the value of the salved
property.66
B.

The Salving Property's Value

Although the value of the salving property used in salving operations has been deemed to be one of the ingredients to be used
when determining the amount of the salvage award, admiralty
courts have been less concerned with this ingredient than with
58. Id. at 530.
59. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 43, at 561.

60. The value judgment problem when setting priorities in Clifford's ingredients is alluded to in the discussion concerning the danger ingredient. See note 92 infra.
61.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 43, at 561.

62. See, e.g., The Mexico, 252 F. 880 (E.D. Va. 1918); Beach Salvage Corp. of Fla. v.
The Captain Tom, 201 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla. 1961).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Nolan v. A.H. Basse Rederiaktieselskab, 267 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1959).
66. It is beyond the scope of this article to demonstrate property valuation techniques.
To do so, even in a skeletal form, would require the intensive and extensive coverage of an
entire article. The determination of value vis-i-vis stipulation and judicial sale, using such
evaluation techniques as income generation, reproduction costs, replacement costs, market
value determination, and insurance value, is neither simply nor quickly dismissed.
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497

others.67 As with the value of the salved property, the value of the
salving property is determined at the time of the salvage.
While the value of the salving property6 8 is not determinative
of the size of the salvage award, its constraining affect is exemplified in The Ocklawaha.69 In this case it was acknowledged that the
salving property was worth approximately $56,000. Therefore, it
was reasoned that to allow the trial award of $45,000 to stand
would mean that the salvor "would receive over an 80% recovery
on its capital risked."7 Consequently, for that reason, and also because the risk involved was over-estimated by the trial court, the
salvage award was reduced to $22,730.53, or approximately forty
percent "recovery on the capital risked."' 7 1 The value of salving
property seems to have been used by admiralty courts either as a
separate variable, or as a justification for an award which is buoyed
by one of the other more important main ingredients.
C

The Salvor's Labor Expenditures

It appears that for labor to have a significant impact upon the
amount of the salvage award, it must be uniquely superlative.7 2
Moreover, the time spent during the labor of salving affects the salvage award depending upon how the time is related to the risk incurred by the salvors or their property. For example, in The George
W Clyde,73 a salvage award of $1000 was given the salvors where
the value of the salved vessel and cargo was estimated at $50,000.
This was because the salving labor lasted for only fifteen minutes
and was made in the near total absence of risk or danger.
Another example of the courts seeking the ingredient of peril,
danger, or risk as a concomitant to the time of salving labor expended is witnessed in Sobonis v. Steam Tanker National
Defender74 where the vessel S.S. Mesologi was chartered by the
S.S. National Defender to relieve the latter of some of its cargo
67. The Devonian, 150 F. 831 (D. Mass. 1907).
68. It should be noted that the cargo and freight aboard the salving property are not
considered part of the value of the salving property. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 43.
69. 348 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1965).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. For examples of court discussion of this ingredient, see The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524
(E.D.S.C. 1930), and The Sandringham, 10 F. 556 (E.D. Va. 1882).
73. 86 F. 665 (2d Cir. 1898). For the same type of reasoning in the reduction of a
salvage award, see The Egbert H., 131 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1942).
74. 298 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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after the former had run aground on a reef. In Nicholas E Vernicos
Shoping Company Ltd v. United States7 5 the court similarily acknowledged that the simplicity of the salving operation and the
minimal risk incurred by both the salved and salving vessel indicated "an instance of low order salvage" labor. Hence, this influenced the final award of $24,098.70 to the salvors and wages to the
crew.
A reading of decisions concerning the labor ingredient leads
one to conclude that this ingredient is almost meaningless and requires that its value be established by its relationship to the risk,
danger, or peril76 incurred by either the salved or salvors.
D.

The Degree of Dangerfrom Which Property
and Lives are Rescued

A significant factor in determining whether the service rendered by the salvors should be compensated by a large, moderate,
or small award is the degree of danger from which the property or
life has been delivered. A large award is usually found where the
peril of loss to lives or property7 7 is imminent. Salved property is
considered in serious danger when destruction is imminent.7 8
Connolly v. S S Karina JJ79 provides an outstanding example
of a court's reliance on the seriousness of the danger to determine
the amount of salvage award. The fishing boat Terecita responded
to the S.S. Karina II's call for help by towing the disabled vessel to
safety. It was determined that the plaintiffs were salvor's in the
highest sense of the word because the risk of loss of their ship,
cargo, and crew would have been total if the ship had drifted onto
75. 233 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
76. The risk, danger, or peril type of ingredient is one most often embellished with a
labor ingredient discussion.
77. The inclusion of life or lives with property certainly is not meant to reduce the
value of human life to monetary terms. Yet, it must be acknowledged that, in spite of the
obvious theoretical repugnancy for doing the same, it is done commonly by courts as well as
by the insurance industry. While a discussion concerning the validity of reducing life to
monetary terms may be an appropriate philosophical or religious topic, it is not an appropriate one for this article.
78. See, e.g., S. Am. S.S. Co. v. Alt. Towing Co., 22 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1927) and United
States v. The Barge CBC 603, 233 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. La. 1964) where it was acknowledged
that the serious danger from which the barge was rescued was the major determinant of the
salvage award. It should be noted that no attempt will be made to discuss the infinite number
of perilous conditions which may yield a serious danger. Fire, explosions, and severe weather
are a few of the potential serious dangers. To fully list and discuss them is meritorious of
separate treatment.
79. 302 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the coral reef. The court acknowledged that its finding a $6,300 salvage award for the plaintiffs was primarily based upon the gravity
of peril to the loss of property.
On the other hand, when the danger is moderate or slight,
court awards reflect this determination. A salvage situation of this
type does not have the immediacy of a large or total loss. While
these perilous situations feature danger and anxiety, the certainty of
destruction and hopelessness witnessed by the grave danger situation is not present. For example, in The Alice8 ° the court found
moderate or slight danger when a vessel was imperiled by a fire that
could be either confined or was too remote to create an apprehension of danger. Unquestionably, when the element of danger to life
and/or salved property is diminished, a diminution of the value of
the salvage service occurs. This same point is illustrated further by
Star Towing Co. v. The Barge Org-6504s ' where the court held that
the Star was a meritorious salvor to the tune of $5,250 for its efforts
in saving a sinking barge. The court admitted that the award recognized the important fact that "the salvage was not effected in hazardous conditions" and that there was no apparent danger to the
Star's personnel or equipment. Logically, when the salved property
is in no peril and never claimed to be, no award should be made.
E

The Salvor's Risk

The ingredient of the salvor's risk to life and property is one of
the more important independent variables when determining the
amount of the salvage award. The degree of risk to which a salvor
exposes himself, as long as it is not foolish or heedless, 2 must be
considered with the other circumstances surrounding the salvage
service. To this point, Sir William Scott in the 19th century stated
that
what enhances the pretentions of salvors most is the actual danger which they have incurred. The value of human life is that
which is, and ought to be, principally considered in the preservation of other men's property, and if it be shown to have been
80. 244 F. 415 (4th Cir. 1917). See also The Emanuel Stauroudis, 23 F.2d 214, 217 (D.
Md. 1927) where the court stresses the salience of danger and labor as salvage award determinants.
81. Star Towing Co. v. The Barge ORG-6504, 301 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1969).
82. See, e.g., Beach Salvage Corp. of Fla. v. The Captain Tom, 201 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.
Fla. 1961), in which the court noted that when peril can be avoided, but is not, the perilous
conditions should not be considered when determining the amount of the salvage award.
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hazarded, it is most highly estimated.83
Certainly, the risk the salvor faces either enhances or diminishes
the amount of the award to be made. Yet, its absence should not
preclude an award being made.84 In essence, when the risks to
which the salvors are exposed are greater, ceretisparibus,the award
should be greater than when the risk is minimal or absent. In
Young v. Smith,8" a salvage award of $4,400.31 was given to a salvor, $1,000 of which was an acknowledgement that the salvor had
undergone substantial risk. The particular risk in this case entailed
the salvor being threatened by Guatemalan gun boats during the
salvage operation. Note that the award was made even though the
value of the property employed by the salvor was negligible.
Another example of the effect that risk has on the amount of
the salvage award appears in The Ocklawaha.86 There an appellate
court reduced the amount of a salvage award from $45,000 to
$22,730.53, noting that the risks encountered by the salvor had been
severely overstated and that the record did not indicate either unusually high seas or any danger of the salving vessel breaking up.
The court further stated that, throughout the salving operation, the
salving "personnel and equipment were not exposed to endure peril
beyond the danger which attends a vessel. . . stranded. . . in the
face of the open ocean. 87
The incidents and circumstances under which courts have
deemed serious risks arising are voluminous. Suffice it to say that
the existence, or lack thereof,88 of serious weather, fire, explosions,8 9 and other serious risks where the salving property and lives
are endangered, have all had an impact upon the ultimate size of
the award.
F

Salvage Service Promptitude, Skill, and Energy

The promptness, skill, and energy with which salvors undertake their tasks affect the amount of the salvage award. In some
instances the absence of these qualities may be fatal to a salvage
effort. For example, great promptness and energy when fighting a
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
1956).

The B.C. Terry, 9 F. 920, 927 (D. Ga. 1881).
This assumes that the service rendered is a salvage and not a pretense at salvage.
1966 Am. Mar. Cases 2654 (Md.).
348 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 629.
Id.
Devine v. United Transportation Co., 1957 Am. Mar. Cases 175 (W.D. Wash.
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fire aboard a vessel9" being salved must be favorably received by
the courts. Indeed, if all other factors remain equal, a salvage
award may be enhanced or diminished by considering the promptness, skill, and energy employed by the salvors. Courts of admiralty
have been quick to laud and reward salvors where their operations
have been marked with skill, experience, and judgement. 9
In The Ocklawaha,92 the court commented on the fact that the
salved vessel was saved by the "timely and energetic" 9 3 efforts of
the salving vessel and thereby acknowledged the salvor's skill and
energy when considering the amount of the salvage award. Actually, it appears that the trial court may have been unduly influenced
by the salvor's efforts when arriving at an award, because the appellate court lessened the award on other grounds.94
In Nicholas E Vernicos Shipping Company Ltd v. United
States,9 5 the court determined that the tugs Vernicos Manos and
Kentavros were salvors because of the salvor's quick and conscientious work on behalf of the U.S.S. Altair and the U.S.S. Mercury.
The Vernicos court held that the salvors exhibited skill and dispatch by pushing against the ships for four hours in a fifty knot
storm to prevent the lines from breaking. 96 This action greatly reduced, and possibly eliminated, the salved ships exposure to certain
disaster. Therefore, the salvor's skill and promptitude was an important consideration when determining the amount of the salvage
award. That court also acknowledged that "the promptness of their
'
response to the call for assistance weighs heavily in their favor"97
and "the skill and efficiency displayed by the libellants during the
time of their service is unquestioned." 98 Thereupon, a $24,098.70
90. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 43, at 559.

91. See, e.g., The Santa Barbara, 299 F. 152 (4th Cir. 1924) and Joncich v. Xitco, 172
F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1949). See also Baretich v. United States, 97 F. Supp. 600, 604 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) where the court said:
Experiences as harrowing as those suffered by the libellants are not common. The
skill and bravery displayed by them and the dangers to which they were subjected
are also not common. Ibelieve, therefore, that they should be rewarded well for
their services, and in my discretion, I award the sum of $2,000 to each of the libellants. In fixing this sum I have taken into consideration the skill and bravery displayed by these libellants and the potential dangers to them on this journey
emphasis added).
92. 348 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1965).
93. Id. at 629.
94. Id.
95. 233 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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award plus wages to the crew was presented to the salvor. The court
in Beach Salvage Corporation9 9 also found significant the fact that
the salvor immediately went to work offering salvage services as
soon as the salving equipment arrived.
On the other hand, the absence of skill, promptitude, or energy
may diminish a salvage award. For example, in Nicastro v. The
Peggy B.,' °° the respondent charged that the salvors were unskilled
in their towage and, therefore, a reduction in the amount of the
award was required. The court acknowledged the principle of diminishing the value of the award if the rescue had been unskillful,
but claimed that the towing operation had been conducted in a
manner that experienced fishermen deemed proper.
It seems fair to conclude that, while promptitude, skill, and
energy definitely influence the amount of salvage awards, such factors certainly have not been determinative of salvage award
amounts. Therefore, they must be viewed in the light of Clifford's
other main ingredients.
V.

THE NORMATIVE MODEL

After considering all of Clifford's main ingredients in a disaggregate manner, it is obvious that the court's analysis must ultimately be made on an aggregate plane. It also is obvious that any
analysis must recognize each ingredient separately. In short, any
meaningful and predictable salvage award decision must be based
on the proper measurement of and relationship between each of
Clifford's six main ingredients by using "the law"' in conjunction
with the logical equities of the surrounding circumstances. It is at
this precise point that the traditional legal decision analysis casts its
proponents adrift; but it is also at this precise point that modem
probability decision theory is available to effectuate a rescue.
Clifford's ingredients must be acknowledged and evaluated by each
court. It is with this evaluation that the courts have failed, because
they have not recognized the relationship that exists between these
99. Beach Salvage Corp. of Fla. v. The Captain Tom, 201 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla.
1961).
100. 173 F. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1959). A similar evaluation was made by the court in
Conolly v. S.S. Karina II, 302 F. Supp. 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The court acknowledged that
the captain and his crew were mariners by avocation and, therefore, hardly could be "expected to display the skill of professional salvors who are entitled to higher awards because
of their professionalism."
101. "The law" primarily refers to case law, but certainly the notion of statutory law,
while not considered in this work, is included.
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ingredients. Moreover, each ingredient must be determined, and
measured or evaluated.
The establishment of measurement and relationship schemes is
a necessary operation for the structuring of discretion in judicial
decisions. This is consistent with Davis' conceptualization of controlling excessive discretion. 0 2
In the face of an uncertain outcome, and no objective sample
data, Justice Clifford is demanding that evaluations be attached to
his independent variables resulting in the determination of the salvage award. Clifford's ingredients and their wide acceptance demands that those who determine a salvage award must bring their
best judgement to bear by using optimum common sense and legal
instincts to: 1) quantitatively determine the specific relationship to
be given each independent variable with the dependent variable;
and 2) establish the value of each independent variable which, in
conjunction with its relationship, will determine ultimately the
amount of the salvage award. Clifford's call to establish and implement a measured relationship scheme is less explicit than Hand's;
nevertheless, it exists and therefore demands investigation.
With a case law understanding of Clifford's main ingredients,
the necessity for measurement and evaluation firmly established,
and the nature of the measurement theory understood, all that remains is the actual implementation of the decision-analysis scheme
which is offered herein. Implementation is comprised of two basic
tasks. The first task that any court must face when implementing
the scheme offered is to discover the relationship that each independent variable has with the other independent variables
(Clifford's main ingredients). This discovery should be made according to evolved case law and its adjustments. Each court should
seriously consider prior decisions and their apparent rationales, as
well as the surrounding circumstances of the case at bar.
At first glance this methodology may be seen as a mere restatement of present legal methodology because of similar use of case
law, rationale, and surrounding circumstances. That, however, is
not the case. Unfortunately, present legal methodology does not
press the necessity of specifying measured relationships among the
ingredients with appropriate statements of justification. At present,
all that appears necessary is that the ingredients be acknowledged
and considered in some nebulous and mystical manner immedi102. K.

DAVIS,

supra note 1.
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ately preceding the determination of a given salvage award. 10 3
One could logically conclude that the measured relationships
of the ingredients and the rationale for establishing patterns will
aid the predictability of decisions and benefit the marketplace of
judicial decision making."° These measured relationships will
force an unprecedented openness of judicial decision making. This

technique structures the heretofore unstructured judicial discretion
employed when determining salvage awards. Subjective probability
is the theoretical basis for such information gathering and usage.
The basis of most subjective probability analysis is the utilization of
existing information to improve one's decision making ability. In
essence, the more information in the legal marketplace, the more
perfect and predictable the marketplace will be. As economics
posits more open information on the marketplace, the likelihood of
having a freer and fairer marketplace increases. 0 5
i03. See notes 43 and 75 supra, and accompanying text.
104. See note 105 infra.
105. The concept of the perfect marketplace, or perfectly competitive marketplace, is
borrowed from economic theory. Stated simply, economics posits that the most desirable
marketplace is where all parties are permitted complete and free access to and from, as well
as interaction within, the marketplace. The problem of achieving a perfect marketplace is
that of materializing the few basic assumptions that underlie perfect competition. The assumption that appears to be both a partial basis for the other assumptions, as well as the
most often violated, is that of perfect information. Perfect information means that each marketplace actor has correct and complete information about all other marketplace actors. The
result of perfect information is a marketplace that is perfectly fluid on both the supply and
demand sides. Thus, each producer would maximize his profit, and each consumer would
maximize his utility by purchasing the best quality goods possible at their lowest price levels.
The general topic of the economics of information has commanded considerable attention recently. See e.g., F. MACHLUP, THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE
IN THE UNITED STATES (1962) and George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. OF
POL. ECON. 3 (1961) who have considered this subject matter. This topic generally stresses
the strong relationship between imperfect information and an imperfect marketplace.
The importance of information within our legal system is well documented both by our
laws and administrative agencies. For example, freedom aspects of information often are
quoted from the constitution. Moreover, the channel of distribution through which information flows to the marketplace, the mass media, is a primary concern of both the Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.
Lest the marketplace analogy become mired in the quagmire of economic theory, one
could charge the legal system as being a monopoly that injures competition. The indictment
is clear. The law, of its own volition, has prevented a truly competitive adversary system by
perpetuating imperfect information. Perfect legal information is that which is not only truthful and accessible to all parties, but interpretively predictable by all parties as well. If we are
to embrace the notion that justice should not be general and, hence, unpredictable, then we
its correlative, also must be embraced. That is, that justice has an inequitable base. Justice
will be more than just for those able to acquire sensitive information about the characteristics
of a judge, jury, injury, or geography, than for those who may not have the same acquisition
opportunity. All parties to an adversary proceeding should be able to estimate, with reason-
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Once the courts have established the proper relationship between each of Clifford's independent variables they must complete
the second operational task. A value for each variable must be determined. The value assigned to the behavior of any given variable
relates to the expected value or the extreme of that variable. Given
a range of possible values, the court must decide the value of a
particular variable.
The scheme for determining the amount of a salvage award
will consider: 1) the nature of the measurement technique or value
determination for Clifford's ingredients; 2) the relationships between Clifford's ingredients; and 3) the operation of the formula
derived from the measurement and relationship schemes pertaining
to Clifford's ingredients.
A.

Value or Measurement Determinations

First, a functional view of Clifford's list is necessary.
The formula is: Y f (XI, X2, X3, X4 , X5 , and X6).
Y = Salvage award amount.
X, = Degree of danger from which property and/or life was
rescued.
X2 = Value of property saved.
X 3 = Risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property
from the impending peril.
X 4 = Promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering
the service and saving the property.
X5 = Value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and the danger to which such property was exposed.
X6 = Labor and time expended by the salvors in rendering
the salvage service.
Next, a value for each variable must be determined. It is suggested that the usual legal procedures for determining personal
property valuation be used for X2 and X 5. Essentially the same
method should be utilized for the valuation of X 6 regarding the
salvor's time and efforts expended. A monetary value for these variables must be stated and proven by a series of evidenciary offerings
and counter-offerings. Consequently, an empirically precise
amount developed within a sound rationale should evolve for each
variable.
able accuracy and certainty, the nature of their positions relative to each other as well as to
the law. Their ability to make such estimates are tied inextricably to the balance between
perfect information and uncontrolled or imperfect information.
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X, X 3, and X 4 are variables whose values are not readily measurable. Yet, a valuation must be placed upon these variables. It is
suggested that subjective probability be deployed. Specifically, XI,
the degree of danger from which the property was rescued, should
be valued on a probability continuum where 1.00 represents maximum peril and .00 represents no peril whatsoever. The parties to
the adversary proceeding should present evidence concerning the
probability of danger whereupon the judicial decision maker,
whether judge or jury, would then face the difficult and precise task
of subjectively determining the degree or probability of danger. If
the determination were made by a jury, it should be accomplished
by averaging the assessments among the decision makers. The same
format would be appropriate for X3 and X 4 .

B.

Relationship Determination

Once the valuation scheme for Clifford's main ingredients is

determined, then

e relatinshl

between

hei

redients ust be

established. There are three possible formats to be used when
establishing these relationships. First, the internal approach would
view case law precedent resulting in a retrospective determination
of the relationship. Second, the external approach would consider
only the attitudes and opinions of the decision makers. 10 6 A poll
would then be taken to discover the relationships between
Clifford's variables. The third format would adopt some combination of the internal and external approach.
This article will pursue the internal approach because of its
entrenchment in the legal field. By adopting this approach it can be
demonstrated that even an entrenched format can service the need
of controlling judicial discretion. Hopefully, the result will be the
elevation ofjustice by fostering judicial decisions that are more predictable, explainable, and understandable.
The following formula is deducted from the relationships
among Clifford's ingredients as gleaned from case law.

Y

= XI. X3.

X 4 (X 2 + X 5 + X 6 )

where Y ! Z 2
The value of the salvage award (Y) is constrained by the value of
the salved property (X 2) because the salved property theoretically is
the upper limit of the salvage award.' 0 7 The salvage award values
of the property salved (X 2), the salving property (X.), and the time
106. Decision makers here specifically refers to judges and/or juries.
107. See note 70 supra, and accompanying text.
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and labor spent salving (X 6) are separately measurable and, thus,
conceptually severable. Each of these variables uniquely contributes to the value of the total salvage award in a mathematical sense.
For example, a salvage award can be very large because the value
of the property salved is very large. °8 This is so regardless of the
salvor's property or his time and labor. Because these variables
clearly are independent, they may be totaled. The value of the danger or peril from which the property was rescued (X,), the risk to
the salvors (X 3), and the skill of the salving operation (X 4) contribute to the ultimate salvage award by effecting the directly valued
variables of X 2 , X., and X6 . If the danger is great, the proportionate
recovery of the salved property and the salvor's property and labor
should be increased accordingly. Further, it should be noted that
X, X3 , and X4 are largely interdependent. More importantly, however, is the fact that each variable effects the values of X2, X., and
X 6. This means that XI, X 3, and X 4 must be multiplied by each
other as well as by each of the total directly valued variables of X 2 ,
X5 , and X 6.
C. .4 Hypothetical
The utility of the above measurement and relationship
schemes can be demonstrated by considering the following example. Let us hypothesize that through proper evidentiary offerings,
case law application, and property evaluation techniques, it was determined that the value of the property salved (X 2) was $100,000,
the value of the property employed by the salvors (X5 ) was $40,000,
and the labor and time spent by the salvors (X6) was worth $20,000.
Further, let us say that the judicial decision maker, using case law
and best judgments, determines that the degree of danger (X,) was
assessed at .8, the risk incurred by the salvors (X 3) was assessed at
.5, and the degree of promptitude, skill, and energy (X 4) was also
assessed at .5. Finally, the formula should be applied to the obtained results for the purpose of determining the salvage award,
recognizing that the award may not exceed $100,000. Thus:
Y = .80 x .50 x .50 ($100,000 + $40,000 + $20,000)
Y = .2 ($160,000)
Y = $32,000 which < $100,000.
Granted, this proposed scheme for determining salvage awards
is not innovative. Actually, it is a mere conceptual operational extension of Hand's "calculus" in addition to being a response to the
108. See notes 65-74 supra, and accompanying text.
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call for legal empiricism. Given the uncomplicated nature of the
measurement system, the scheme might even be criticized as being
too simplistic. This schedule's most obvious shortcomings include
the fact that different decision makers in different courtrooms may
assign unique values to the variables based on their different characteristics and experiences, as well as the different circumstances of
each case. This criticism seems to diminish the generality of the
proposed scheme and, hence, its predictability. This criticism, however, exists whether or not the scheme of empirical evaluation is
implemented. Further, a concomitant of the proposed scheme is the
requisite justification of the subjective value assigned to the variables in Clifford's formula. This enumerated process fulfills Davis'
requirement of "openness" when structuring discretion. Consequently, a more open and perfect marketplace of information
should occur in which all of the above mentioned conflicts may be
acknowledged, assessed, and utilized when determining the subjective values to attach to Clifford's independent variables.
A major source of instability and unpredictability may be seen
in the fact that the value assessment of Clifford's ingredients, particularly those variables whose values are couched in probabilities,
are permitted a measure of flexibility in the spirit of subjectively
based decision making. This elastic nature is permitted for the purpose of including other courtroom's subjective evaluations and objective market data when they become available. However, this
criticism fails to recognize the value of the act of perfecting the
marketplace of information. As more information, including both
subjective evaluations and objective market data, becomes available, this perfection should occur. Moreover, one should not forget
the fact that, in the legal system's marketplace, dynamism is a virtue rather than a vice. Hence, while a static formula may remove
uncertainty, it may do so to the exclusion of equitable justice administration. Yet, a high degree of stability may be maintained by
balancing the goal of dynamism with that of predictability.
The utilization of existing case law to derive the relationships
between Clifford's various ingredients may be criticized. However,
this scheme's ability to maintain an evolving format when applying
modem decision techniques, without destroying previously determined legal substance, effectively counters such criticisms. The proposed scheme may be seen as both too complex and time
consuming for an already overwhelmed judicial system that shows
dockets that are overburdened and thus delay the timeliness ofjushttps://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol8/iss3/9
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tice. While this criticism has some facial validity, it quickly fades
upon the realization that the present system has been the cause of
those delays. One must recognize that every scheme has its costs
and benefits that must be balanced against one another. The cost of
the proposed scheme involves the restraints placed upon judicial
decision makers and the initial time necessary to implement this
scheme.
The benefits to be derived from such a scheme include the fact
that, because of this scheme's inherent goal of structuring discretion, it struggles against unbridled and uncontrolled discretionary
action. This should have the beneficial effect of making the law
more explainable, describable, and predictable. More importantly,
the scheme's inherent quantum approach struggles against uncontrolled discretion by placing the judicial decision maker under
strong pressure to rationalize and justify each variable's value,
rather than to permit determinations based upon nebulous phrases
and reasoning. As familiarity and experience with this scheme increases, judicial resources should be conserved and channeled
under the scheme's focal direction and generalizations.
In essence, the benefits to be reaped from this scheme would
far outstrip the costs, because a more perfect, explainable, predictable, and efficient marketplace of justice would occur where discretion is controlled and the determinations of salvage awards are a
product of high quality legal decision making. Hopefully this proposed scheme will enable the legal system to be acknowledged as
an evolving behavioral science embracing the goals of "theory...
prediction, description and explanation."'' 0 9
VI.

CONCLUSION

Admittedly, the proposed scheme is not without its imperfections. Nevertheless, if the proposed scheme were followed, the
courts, to a large extent, could move from the unpredictable, uncertain, and basically uncontrolled judicial discretionary cloak which
controls the determination of salvage awards, to a more predictable, certain, and controlled determination of those awards. The
proposed model should improve in quality as the number and variety of courts and cases using such a scheme increase.

109.

See notes 36 and 37 supra.
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